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FIRST AMENDMENT VERSUS SIXTH
AMENDMENT: A CONSTITUTIONAL BATTLE
IN THE JUVENILE COURTS
JILL K. McNULTY*
INTRODUCTION
State laws and court rules which refuse to allow the news media to
publish a juvenile's misdeeds are designed to protect juveniles from
public exposure of those misdeeds. At the same time, such laws keep
the public from knowing how the judicial system deals with juvenile
offenders. In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,' the United States
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state law denying newspapers
the right to publish a juvenile offender's name,' thus resolving the
conflict in favor of the public's right to know. With its decision in
Smith, the Supreme Court has at last focused national attention
upon important constitutional problems which have increasingly
concerned juvenile courts and the news media.
This paper explores the contrasting policies regarding publicity of
the adult criminal and juvenile justice systems, considers whether a
minor has a right under the sixth amendment to demand a public
trial in state juvenile offender proceedings, and discusses the central
concern of Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., i.e., first amendment implications of state attempts to restrict news media access to
or publication of information obtained from juvenile court records
and hearings. In addition, the recommendations of the Task Force
on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and of the Institute
for Judicial Administration-American Bar Association Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards on the foregoing issues are
analyzed. Finally, some recommendations for the alleviation of conflict between the news media and the juvenile justice system are suggested.
*Associate Judge, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois; Professor of Law (on leave),
lIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law, Chicago, Illinois; A.B., Northwestern University,
Evanston, Illinois, 1957; J.D., Northwestern University, Chicago, Illinois, 1960. The author
expresses her gratitude to Michael D. Fine, third-year law student at lIT/Chicago-Kent College
of Law, for his help with the research for this article.
1. 99S. Ct. 2667 (1979).
2. Id. at 2672.
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THE CONTRASTING POLICIES OF THE ADULT
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE JUVENILE SYSTEM
REGARDING PUBLICITY
The CriminalJusticeSystem
The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
. . .abridging the freedom . . . of the press"; 3 the sixth amendment provides that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime has been committed . . . . "' Tension exists between the constitutional right of the
news media under the first amendment to gather and disseminate information about court proceedings and the right of a person criminally accused to a fair and impartial trial under the sixth amendment. This tension has continually concerned the press and the judicial, legislative, and executive branches of government at every level.
One focus of current discussion is the impact of television cameras
filming trials in progress on a defendant's right to a fair trial.
Another is the right of news reporters to protect confidential sources
from compulsory disclosure through subpoena when a defendant
claims that such information is essential to defend himself against
serious criminal charges. A recent New York case illustrates the latter problem.' A New York Times reporter was jailed and substantial
fines were imposed against his newspaper for contempt of court. The
reporter and the newspaper had refused to produce investigative
notes for court inspection. The court determined the notes should
have been produced to enable the court to decide whether they would
be helpful in preparing the defense of a physician accused of
murder. 6
Although the proper interface between the rights protected by the
first and the sixth amendments engenders heated debate, this much is
certain: a criminal trial is a public event, the record of what transpires is public property, and under most circumstances may be reported with impunity.' The public has a right to know what goes on
in the courtroom as long as the accused's right to a fair trial in
criminal proceedings is not impaired.' Underlying these statements is
3. U.S. Const. amend. 1.
4. Id. amend. VI.
5. In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
6. Id. at __,
394 A.2d at 338.
7. See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
8. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). But see Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898
(1979) (upholding judge's right to bar the press from a pretrial suppression hearing).
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the principle that the public must have such information to assess
adequately the performance of its public servants and the functioning of its courts. The press has traditionally supplied this information. "The free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public
interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public
officers and employees, and generally informing the citizenry of
public events and occurrences, including court proceedings." 9
The access of the press to the courtroom is therefore merely derivative of the public's right to know. The United States Supreme Court
has declared that the access rights of the press to governmental information are coextensive with those of the public ' I and that the first
amendment confers no greater access rights than those the public in
general possess."
[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech.
and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It
is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters,which isparamount. 2
The Juvenile Justice System
In contrast to the openness of the adult criminal trial mandated by
the sixth amendment, no clear constitutional guidelines exist with
respect to public or press access to juvenile court delinquency hearings. The United States Supreme Court in McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania'3 declared that the sixth amendment does not mandate
jury trials in juvenile delinquency proceedings on the ground that
such proceedings are not "criminal prosecution[s].'"'
A basic goal of the separate juvenile court system, which has existed in Illinois since 1899, has been to rehabilitate, rather than to
punish, children charged with criminal law violations." This objective continues to be recognized in a great majority of states,1 6 has
9. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
10. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (concerning access to prisoners).
11. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978). Neither the first amendment nor the fourteenth amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of information and the news media have no constitutional right of access to a county jail over and
above that of other persons to interview inmates and make sound recordings, films, and
photographs for publication and broadcasting by newspapers, radio, and television. This position was also taken in Gannett, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979).
12. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (emphasis added).
13. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
14. Id. at 541.
15. Id. at 539-40.
16. See Cal. Weif. & Inst. Code §§ 502-503 (West 1972); 111.Ann. Stat. ch. 37, §§ 701-2
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 18, § 2 (West 1973).
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been acknowledged by the Supreme Court in several cases, 7 and is
intended to serve the welfare of both the child and society. To
accomplish this goal, most states have statutorily provided that an
adjudication of delinquency does not result in the imposition of civil
disabilities, e.g., loss of right to vote or hold public office, that ordinarily result from a criminal conviction.'" States attempt to assure
that the child's contacts with the juvenile justice system are helpful
and do not adversely affect him.
The rehabilitative goal of the juvenile court has, however, too
rarely been achieved.' 9 The existence of a juvenile police or court
record and the publication of numerous cases of juvenile misbehavior and criminality have been identified as major obstacles to
rehabilitation. Employment opportunities may be limited, educational opportunities may be threatened, and the possibility of joining
the armed forces may be foreclosed. Finally, publicity surrounding a
delinquency charge may result in social ostracism by a society that
fails to differentiate between criminal conduct committed by those
under a certain age and those over it. These factors have led a number of states to pass statutes allowing expungement of juvenile police
and court records and statutes obstructing public and news media access to juvenile proceedings. 2
THE PROBLEM OF PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN THE
MEDIA'S RIGHT TO INFORMATION AND THE MINOR'S
RIGHT TO CONFIDENTIALITY IN
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS
The Minor's "Right" to a Public TrialSixth Amendment Concerns
The leading case discussing the subject of public trials in relation
to the sixth amendment enumerates the values of permitting the
17. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541
(1966).
18. Howard, Grisso, & Neems, Publicity andJuvenile Court Proceedings, II Clearinghouse
Review 203, 204 (1977); see also I1l. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, §§ 702-9 (Smith-Hurd 1972). Criminal
jurisprudence is based upon notions of moral blameworthiness and condemnation. Punishment has a fourfold purpose: (1) future deterrence of the specific individual who commited the
act, (2) deterrence of the general public through punishment of the specific violator, (3)
retribution, and (4) incapacitation of the violator from further criminality through imprisonment. See generally F. Allen, The Borderland of Criminal Justice 49-60 (1964); S. Kadish & M.
Paulsen, Criminal Law and Its Processes 2-5 (3d ed. 1975); See also I11.Ann. Stat. ch. 38,
§§ 1-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
19. Seeln re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. Gough, The Expungement ofAdjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A
Problem of Status, 1966 Wash. U.L.Q. 147, 168-74. See also Note, Rights and Rehabilitation
in the Juvenile Courts, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 281, 285-89 (1967).
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"public" to view court proceedings." Public viewing safeguards
society against courts being used as a weapon of persecution, checks
abuse of judicial power, calls the facts of a case to the attention of
previously unknown witnesses, teaches citizens about their government, and instills confidence in judicial remedies.2 The net effect is
to "guarantee that the accused [is] fairly dealt with. .
"23 Justice
Brennan has stated that openness in the judicial process is analogous
to the function of a jury; it protects the accused from possible
judicial oppression by submitting judicial behavior to the forum of
public opinion.24
The Institute for Judicial Administration-American Bar Association Juvenile Justice Project's Standards Relating to Adjudication
(hereinafter referred to as IJA-ABA Standards Relating to Adjudication), recommends that "[ejach jurisdiction should provide by
law that a respondent in a juvenile court adjudication proceeding has
a right to a public trial." 2 The Supreme Court in McKeiver,
however, held that juvenile proceedings are not "criminal prosecutions" within the meaning of the sixth amendment and a juvenile has
no absolute right to a jury trial. 6 Mr. Justice White, concurring,
declared that a jury trial in juvenile cases is not necessary because the
distinctive intake policies and procedures of the juvenile system are
sufficient to protect youthful offenders from overzealous prosecutors. As to judicial misfeasance, he asserted that the system
itself "eschews punishment for evil choice." 2 7 The majority found
that requiring a jury trial in juvenile cases would remake the system
into an adversary proceeding with the attendant delay, formality,
and clamor, but would fail to remedy any defects of the system or
improve the fact finding process. 28 Such a drastic change would
mean abandoning the traditional goals of fairness, concern, and
parental involvement in the juvenile courts; it would close the door
on the ideal of an informal, protective proceeding. 9 The Court cited
with approval a Pennsylvania court's"0 commendation of the
21. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
22. Id. at 270.
23. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538 (1965).
24. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 554-55 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
25. IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating to Adjudication, Std
6.1, at 70 (Tent. Draft 1977) [hereinafter cited as IJA-ABA Standards-Adjudication].
26. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
27. Id. at 552 (White, J., concurring).
28. 403 U.S. at 545-51 (majority opinion).
29. Id.
30. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. Ct. 62, 234 A.2d 9 (1967).
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Supreme Court's refusal to impose all rights constitutionally assured
for adults, including the right to a jury trial, on juvenile court proceedings. " 'It is clear to us that the Supreme Court has properly
attempted to strike a judicious balance by injecting procedural
orderliness into the juvenile court system. It is seeking to reverse the
trend "whereby the child receives the worst of both worlds.
•.
993 1 The commentary of the IJA-ABA Standards Relating
to
Adjudication answers the concerns expressed in McKeiver about the
adverse impact of jury trials on juvenile proceedings by citing RLR v
State32 where the Alaska Supreme Court noted that the possible
adverse impact has not been empirically tested and may be false.33
Two appeals were consolidated in McKeiver. Justice Brennan,
concurring in the result reached under Pennsylvania law but dissenting in that reached under North Carolina law, declared that
the approach to the due process concerns taken by the plurality
was clearly inadequate. Agreeing that an adjudicatory hearing is
not a "criminal prosecution," he nevertheless asserted that
fundamental fairness mandates some safeguard in the process
equivalent to that supplied by a jury in the criminal process. The
due process clause commands a "result," not a particular procedure. 3 ' Justice Brennan said that a jury could guarantee this result
(fairness in the fact finding process) in juvenile delinquency
proceedings. In the absence of a jury hearing, "an accused may in
essence appeal to the community at large, by focusing public
attention upon the facts of his trial . . . . -35 The record revealed
that under the Pennsylvania statute, there was no prohibition
imposed by the court against admitting the press or public and, in
practice, the courts generally permitted such access. Justice
Brennan, in affirming the majority result, noted that, "[miost
important, the record in these cases is bare of any indication that
sought to have admitted to the
any person whom the appellants
36
courtroom was excluded."

The North Carolina case, In re Burrus,3 7 presented a different
situation. State law permitted the trial judge to exclude the public.
31. 211 Pa. Super. Ct. at 74, 234 A.2d at 15 (emphasis added) (quoting Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966)).
32. 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971), cited in 1JA-ABA Standards-Adjudication, Std 4.1, note,
at 52.
33. Id. at 37.
34. 403 U.S. at 554 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35. Id. at 555.
36. Id. at 555-56.
37. 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), consol. with McKeiver v. Pennsylvania and aff'd,
403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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The cases before the court concerned the participation of juveniles
in civil rights demonstrations against alleged racial discrimination
in the Hyde County school system. Charged with obstructing traffic and disturbing the peace, both misdemeanors, the youths were
adjudged delinquent and committed to the public welfare
department for placement. 3" The trial judge, exercising his statutory discretion, ordered the public and the press excluded from
the proceedings over the minors' objections. The North Carolina
Court of Appeals affirmed, as did the state supreme court. The
court of appeals refused to allow the juvenile court to become a
public forum for the adults who had instigated the demonstrations.3 9 Emphasizing that exclusion of the public in that case was
beneficial to the child, the court held that the juvenile offenders
were not entitled to demand a public hearing. 4
The United States Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Brennan
dissented, noting that there is nothing in the "North Carolina's
juvenile proceedings that could substitute for public or jury trial
in protecting the petitioners against misuse of the judicial
process. ' He cited the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan
in Duncan v. Louisiana"' for the proposition that access to the
"political process" is a legitimate substitute for the jury system."'
Justice Brennan affirmed the juvenile court philosophy that juvenile adjudications are noncriminal proceedings designed to rehabilitate juvenile offenders."' Nevertheless, he concluded that due
process compels some form of public scrutiny of the fact finding
process. Fundamental fairness at least requires the courts to admit
persons whom the accused minor requests be admitted. In dissenting from the North Carolina decision, Justice Brennan implicitly
rejected the notion that a court alone should determine what, if
any, degree of public exclusion is in the child's best interest. In
the absence of a jury system, the juvenile offender has a constitutional right to a "public" trial, at least to the extent of having
persons he desires present.
The same year McKeiver was decided, the Supreme Court of
Alaska in RLR v. State"s decided whether, under the Alaska Con38. In re Burrus, 4 N.C. App. 523, 167 S.E.2d 454, modified, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879
(1969), consoL with McKeiver v. Pennsylvania and aff'd, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
39. Id. at 460.
40. Id.
41. 403 U.S. at 556 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
42. 391 U.S. 145, 188 (1968).
43. 403 U.S. at 556-57 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44. Id. at 555.
45. 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971).
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stitution, a minor had a right to a public trial in juvenile delinquency
proceedings. Alaska's juvenile court statute provided for blanket
exclusion of the public unless the court in its discretion found that
the attendance of a particular individual at a hearing was "compatible with the best interests of the minor."" 6 Alaska's Rules of
Juvenile Procedure4 7 provided that the interest of the public was to
be considered as well. Citing Justice Harlan's concurrence in Estes v.
Texas, 8 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the right to a public
trial belongs to the accused. 4 9 Noting that
civil labels and good intentions do not themselves obviate the
need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts, for
'[a] proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found
to be "delinquent" and subjected to the loss of his liberty for
years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution,' 50
the court stated that "[tihe reasons for the constitutional guarantees
of public trial apply as much to juvenile delinquency proceedings as
to adult criminal proceedings."'" The court observed that juvenile
cases appealed to the state supreme court often demonstrated more
"extensive and fundamental error than is generally found in adult
criminal cases" and declared that under the Alaska Constitution a
juvenile offender has a constitutional right to a public trial. 52 As to
the statutory and court rule allowance of judicial discretion regarding exclusion and admission, the court ruled that such discretion be
limited to those "persons whose presence is not desired by the child"
nor by his guardian ad litem (who may be appointed where "the
child's choice may be adverse to his own interests"). I3
The Supreme Court's refusal in McKeiver to expand constitutional protection for juveniles in delinquency proceedings halted the
trend begun in the middle 1960's. In the sixties and seventies, the
Supreme Court imposed many features of the adult adversarial system upon juvenile proceedings. In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court in
In re Gault5 ' held that due process, measured by the standard of
46. Alaska Stat. § 47.10.070 (1979).
47. Alaska R. Juv. P. 12(d)(2) (Supp. 1966).
48. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 587 (1965) (Harlan, J.,concurring).
49. 487 P.2d at 36 (citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588 (1965)).
50. Id. at 38 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970)).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 39. The Louisiana Supreme Court has recently reached a similar conclusion. See
In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586 (La.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978). See also Hopkins v. Youth
Court of Issaquena County, 227 So. 2d 282 (Miss. 1969), which held that regardless of the
charge, an accused minor has the right to the presence of a parent.
54. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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"fundamental fairness," requires that a juvenile be afforded certain
procedural protections in an adjudicatory hearing considering a
finding of delinquency." Written notice of charges, advice as to the
right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses,
and freedom from self-incrimination were rights specifically enumerated. 56 The Court has articulated its basic due process requirement in this way:
We do not mean by this to indicate that the hearing to be held
must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or
even of the usual administrative hearings; but we do hold that
the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and
fair treatment."
It is of particular interest that the Supreme Court singled out
administrative hearings as a standard of comparison. As in juvenile
proceedings, the question of due process protections has played an
important and expanding role in such hearings.
In 1971, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia considered whether a closed hearing relating to termination
"for cause" of an employee's contract before the Civil Service Commission was unconstitutional as violative of due process and concluded, in Fitzgerald v. Hampton,"' that it was. Despite a tradition
of judicial hesitancy to intervene in the procedural processes of administrative agencies, the Fitzgeraldcourt permanently enjoined the
Civil Service Commission, its agents, and employees from holding
closed hearings.
Plaintiff Fitzgerald asserted that conducting the hearing in secrecy
would forever deprive him of a fundamental right. The court agreed,
rejecting defendant's argument that since administrative hearings
are not prosecutorial in nature, the full panoply of due process protections does not inure to the plaintiff. While agreeing that indeed
the challenged hearing was not prosecutorial, the court noted that,
"it is nevertheless one where the final outcome is a decision on the
merits of the issues raised, and this decision directly affects the legal
rights of an individual. Fitzgerald's right to a livelihood is at
stake." 9 In due process terms, the right to a livelihood is viewed as a
property interest affecting the liberty to seek future employment.
55. Id. Three years later, in In re Winship, the Supreme Court held that the standard required in a delinquency proceeding is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
56. 387 U.S. at 33, 36, 42, 49.
57. Id. at 30 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966)).
58. 329 F. Supp. 997 (D.D.C. 1971),
59. Id. at 998.
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Citing Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent in McKeiver, the court rejected
the defendant's assertion that a closed hearing was necessary to protect plaintiff's privacy interests.
Comparisons between administrative hearings and juvenile proceedings can be made. Administrative hearings are conducted under
attenuated due process safeguards"0 just as juvenile proceedings
are."' In the Fitzgeraldcase, the interest involved was one of property. In a juvenile court, liberty is at stake. As has often been noted,
both interests invoke due process safeguards. 2 It is no casual coincidence that the fourteenth amendment places liberty before property. Clearly, the district court's reasoning in Fitzgerald is all the
more compelling in a juvenile proceeding where a person's liberty is
at stake.
The cases discussed above suggest that, even in judicial proin which due process protections are attenuated, the right to confidentiality belongs to the accused. This right may be waived by him
in the interest of obtaining a fair hearing by opening the proceedings
to public scrutiny.
The Press'Rightof Access to Juvenile Court ProceedingsOver
Minors' Objections-Sixth and FirstAmendment Concerns in
Privacy Rights
A. The Law in Relation to Adult Trials.
The New York Court of Appeals in United Press Association v.
Valente63 noted that the right to a public trial is a right of the accused
alone. While acknowledging the legitimate public interest in viewing
a court trial, the court stated that the sixth amendment did not grant
the public or press any enforceable right of access to a criminal trial;
if it did, the defendant would be deprived of his right to waive a
public trial. The following discussion involves the few cases in which
courts have been called upon to balance the public's right of access
to court proceedings against an individual's right to a fair trial.
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale6 was the first case in which the
Supreme Court dealt directly with the issue of whether the sixth
amendment confers a right upon the news media to attend a pretrial
suppression hearing over the defendant's objection when a clear and
present danger to his right to a fair trial has not been shown. The
60. See5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976).
61. See text accompanying notes 54-57 supra.
62. See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 329 F. Supp. 997 (D.D.C. 1971).
63. 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
64. 99S. Ct. 2898 (1979).
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Court, while agreeing that the sixth amendment does not guarantee a
right to a private trial, declined to hold that the sixth amendment requires an open pretrial proceeding when the participants in the litigation agree that it should be closed to protect the defendant's right to
a fair trial.6" The majority held "that members of the public have no
constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to
attend criminal trials." 6 ' Gannett also raised the question of whether
the first amendment conferred upon the press a right of access to
criminal pretrial proceedings. The Court declined to answer that
question, stating that "even assuming, arguendo, that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments may guarantee such access in some situations, a question we do not decide, this putative right was given all
appropriate deference by the state nisi prius court in the present
case." 7 The court made it clear, however, that even if a first amendment right of access exists, that right can be limited even when there
is no showing that a clear and present danger exists to the accused's
right to obtain a fair trial.6" The Supreme Court suggested that
courts should balance the press' right to report a court proceeding of
public interest against the extent to which it might impair a defendant's right to a fair trial. 9
The extent to which courts may bar news media from a trial at the
parties' request has been considered by a few state courts. In State ex
rel. Gore Newspaper Co. v. Tyson,70 a Florida appellate court ruled
that excluding the press and public and sealing the record were
beyond the trial judge's power. The parties to the litigation had requested a private hearing but had given no "cogent- reason" why
their request should be granted. The reviewing court noted that circumstances such as the testimony of a child in a domestic relations
case which might result in embarrassment, scandal, or lack of candor could justify such exclusionary and protective orders."
Several courts have considered whether the exclusion of "spectators" from a criminal trial over the defendant's objections violates
his sixth amendment right to a public trial. The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals has acknowledged the propriety of excluding "spec65. Id. at 2907-08.
66. ld. at 2911.
67. Id.at 2912.
68. Id. The clear and present danger test governs the right of government to prohibit
publication of pretrial information lawfully obtained by the press. See Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), for a formulation of the clear and present danger test.
69. 99 S. Ct. at 2912.
70. 313 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), overruled on other grounds, 348 So. 2d 293
(Fla. 1977).
71. Id. at 783.
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tators" during testimony of a victim in a rape case. 2 The interests of
privacy present in a rape prosecution suffice to uphold such orders.73
The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Schmit, 4 however, held
that the exclusion of the general public due to the "obscene" nature
of the testimony violated defendant's right to a public trial even
when members of the press and bar were permitted to remain.
B. The Law in Relation to Juvenile Proceedings.
Several courts have thus held that the public ordinarily has a right
of access to courtroom proceedings in cases involving adults
although some restrictions may be imposed. Ignoring for the moment the question of desirability of excluding the press and public
from juvenile proceedings, the question remains whether a legislative body may constitutionally do so with respect to juvenile delinquency proceedings. In Gault, Mr. Justice Fortas suggested that
since "treatment" is the benefit or the quidpro quo that the minor
receives as a result of the juvenile adjudication process, that process
need not afford all the procedural protections of an adult criminal
trial.7 Several federal courts have supported Justice Fortas' reasoning by holding that a minor has a fourteenth amendment right to
treatment and rehabilitation by the state when he has been deprived
of his liberty by an adjudication process in which procedural safeguards were attenuated.7 6 One might argue that a minor ought to
have greater right to privacy than an adult because adult criminal
and civil trials have a full panoply of procedural safeguards. Following this line of reasoning, the public, including the press, should be
excluded from the courtroom at the minor's request. However, the
Supreme Court held in Davis v. Alaska77 that the state's interest in
protecting a juvenile's court record from public view must yield
72. Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 (1967). See
also Geise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959)
(order of exclusion during testimony of juvenile witness based on embarrassment factor
upheld); State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, 224 P.2d 500 (1950).
73. See Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1076 (1978)
(defendant's right to public trial not absolute. Removal of spectators not violative thereof;
press and others with "substantial interest" permitted to remain).
74. 273 Minn. 78, 139 N.W.2d 800 (1966), limited on other grounds, 166 N.W.2d 710
(1969).
75. 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
76. Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 352 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354
(D.R.I. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'dsub. nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C.
1971); Lollis v. New York Dep't of Social Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified,
328 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
77. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
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when such protection impairs the sixth amendment right of an accused to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.78 cited Davis with approval in
holding that the state's interest in rehabilitating juveniles does not
outweigh the press' right to publish truthful information lawfully
obtained about the identity of a juvenile delinquent." Arguably the
Davis rationale suggests that a minor cannot or should not be permitted to exclude the press from juvenile court proceedings.
Courts in Illinois, Oregon, California, and Minnesota have addressed the first amendment concern of admitting the press to juvenile court proceedings. In In re Jones,8" the minor respondent in a
delinquency hearing waived his right to a public trial and objected
when the trial court admitted a news reporter to the hearing. The Illinois Juvenile Court Act barred the general public from juvenile
court hearings but specifically exempted the news media from the
exclusion. 8 ' The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the minor's claim
that he had a constitutional right to a private trial. It found that the
statute expressed a legislative intent not only to protect the respondent's right to public trial but to preserve "the right of the general
populace to know what is transpiring in its courts."I 2
In 1976, the Oregon Court of Appeals in In re L., 83 was confronted with the question of whether, in light of existing practice, the
trial court's failure to exclude a newsman from a juvenile proceeding
over objection of the child's attorney was reversible error. The Court
ruled that it was not.' 4 The case concerned the appropriate commitment of a minor child who had been removed from the parental
home at age eleven after "a long history of sexual abuse" and who
subsequently had run away from various foster homes and institutions. Under Oregon law, juvenile proceedings were closed to the
public unless the child or his parents requested otherwise. The statute, however, allowed the court to admit such persons "as the judge
finds have a proper interest in the case or the work of the court."' 5
The court of appeals, noting that it would have been advisable to
notify the parties in advance that a reporter would be present, nevertheless held that the court's failure to do so was not reversible
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

99S. Ct. 2667 (1979).
Id. at 2671.
46 111. 2d 506, 263 N.E.2d 863 (1970).
111.Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 701-20(6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
46111. 2d at __, 263 N.E.2d at 864 (1970).
24 Or. App. 257, 546 P.2d 153 (1976).
Id. at
-,
546 P.2d at 155 n. 1.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 419.498(1) (Repl. 1977).
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error.8 6 The reviewing court quoted the trial judge's rationale for
permitting the press to be present.
[Tihe reporter is here with the permission of the Court because
the Court feels this is a case of special, particular significance to
the people of the State of Oregon and because the Court knows
from its own experience this is not an isolated incident where this
particular issue [disposition in regard to proper treatment] has
been involved, and the Court feels that one of the reasons we
have this problem is because the people of the State of Oregon
and, specifically, members of the Legislature, are not really
aware of the magnitude of the problem; and I believe it is the
function of the press as well as the function of all of us to see
that the people of this state and, particularly, members of the
Legislature, are confronted with the grave reality and stark reality of children in need in this state whose needs are not being met
now; and I can't do that, and I think the press can.8 7
The California Supreme Court held in Brian W. v. Superior Court
of Los Angeles County88 that a minor was not constitutionally entitled to exclude the press from a hearing on his fitness to be tried as
an adult. The California statute provided that the public was to be
excluded from juvenile court hearings, and in addition provided that
"[t] he judge.

.

.

may.

.

.

admit such persons as he deems to have

a direct and legitimate interest in the particular case or the work of
the court." 8 9 In response to the minor's argument that admission of
the press would defeat the confidentiality of the juvenile court process, the court quoted with approval the comments of the study commission which drafted the confidentiality provisions of the statute.
"We believe the press can assist juvenile courts in becoming
more effective instruments of social rehabilitation by providing
the public with greater knowledge of juvenile court processes,
procedures and unmet needs. We, therefore, urge juvenile courts
to actively encouragegreaterparticipationby the press. It is the
feeling of the Commission that proceedings of the juvenile court
should be confidential, not secret. "'
The court further noted that media coverage of proceedings had
been neither excessive nor sensational and that prejudicial pretrial
publicity could be neutralized in ways less drastic than excluding the
546 P.2d at 155 n. 1.
86. 24 Or. App. at __,
87. Id.
88. 20 Cal. 3d 618, 574 P.2d 788, 143 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1978) (en banc).
89. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 346 (West Supp. 1979).
90. 20 Cal. 3d at 622-23, 574 P.2d at 790-91, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 719-20 (emphasis by the
court).
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press from proceedings. Granting a change of venue, a continuance,
conducting a searching voir dire of prospective juries, giving corrective instructions to the jury, or sequestering it could neutralize the effects of publicity.
A Minnesota statute grants judges discretion to admit persons
with a direct interest in the work of the juvenile court to juvenile proceedings.9 ' In In re R.L.K.,9 2 the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the news media have such a "direct interest." 9 3 The case involved a termination of parental rights proceeding. The court had
admitted a news reporter, over the objections of the parents' attorneys, after the reporter stated on the record that he would not use
the name of anyone and that he would "mask the addresses." 9 In
balancing the privacy interests of the parents with the news media's
right to gather information about juvenile court proceedings, the
court stated:
The news media have a strong interest in obtaining information
regarding our legal institutions and an interest in informing the
public about how judicial power in juvenile courts is being exercised. The news media thus clearly have "a direct interest

. .

.

in

the work of the court" within the meaning of [the statute]. 9"
The court found no abuse of discretion on the part of the juvenile
court judge in admitting the reporter; the reporter's assurances not
to reveal the names and addresses of the parties were deemed adequate to protect the parties' privacy interests.9"
Justice Wahl, in dissent, was not persuaded that an acceptable balance had been struck in this case.
The parents in the present case had already attained media notoriety by their manslaughter convictions in connection with the
starvation death of another child. The promise of deletion of
names and addresses gave no assurance of confidentiality in the
instant proceedings in view of the factual detail of the coverage
and the ready accessibility of the previously published reports
which expressly identified the parents. Under these circumstances additional publicity would make any prospect of future
reunification of the family, after parental rehabilitation, that
much more difficult. Thus, the publicity would itself be an additional, subtle pressure for termination of parental ties.9 '
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 260.155(1) (West 1971).
269 N.W.2d 367 (Minn. 1978).
Id. at 370.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 371.
Id.at 372.
Id. at 372 (footnotes omitted).
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In the four cases discussed above and in the IJA-ABA Standards
Relating to Adjudication,9 s the rights of the public through the press
to know about juvenile court proceedings and the rights of the minor
to confidentiality were balanced by admitting the press on condition
that no publication of the identity of the minor and his family would
occur.9 9 Whether a court may condition press access to juvenile proceedings on a promise that identities will not be published had never
been considered by the Supreme Court.
The News Media's Right to Publish Information Obtained Through
Direct or IndirectAccess to Court Proceedings
A. The Law In Relation to Adult Proceedings.
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court articulated the necessity
for judicial protection of the defendant's right to a fair trial, stating
that judges must be alert lest the balance of interests weigh against
the accused."If publicity during the proceedings threatens the
fairness of the trial, a new trial should be ordered. But we must
remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those
remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception."' 0
While the Court's holding intimated that some restraint on the
right to publish in adult proceedings might be constitutionally permissible, to date no suggestions as to what form such restrictions
might take have been forthcoming. There are clear indications that
framing such restrictive standards will be difficult, if not impossible.
The Supreme Court has indicated its predisposition in various statements. For any contraction of first amendment rights to withstand
the test of constitutionality, "The substantive evil must be extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. . .. " 0 "The
danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately
imperil." ' The "evil" or "danger" requirements are narrowly
drawn; they require a showing that the restricted behavior in fact impedes justice. 0 3 The reason for this extreme stance is to be found in
98. See IJA-ABA Standards-Adjudication, supra note 25, Stds 6.1, 6.2 & 6.3.
99. Brian W. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal. 3d 618, 622, 574 P.2d 788,
,263 N.E.2d 863, 864
2d 506, __
790, 143 Cal. Rptr. 717, 719 (1978); In re Jones, 46 I11.
(1970); In re R.L.K., 269 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Minn. 1978); In re L., 24 Or. App. 257,
546 P.2d 153,155 n.1 (1976).
100. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (conduct of murder trial due to
overzealous press characterized as Roman Holiday).
101. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
102. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947). Accord, Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(must show clear and present danger based on solidity of the evidence).
103. See Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Publishing Co., 122 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1941), aff'd
per curiam, 316 U.S. 642 (1942).
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the Supreme Court's reluctance to balance first and sixth amendment interests:
I1f the authors of the first and sixth amendments, fully aware of
the potential conflicts between them, were unwilling or unable to
resolve the issue by assigning to one priority over the other, it is
not for us to rewrite the Constitution by undertaking what they
declined to do

.

.

. yet it is nonetheless clear that the barriers to

prior restraint remain high unless we are to abandon what the
Court has said for nearly a quarter of our national existence and
implied throughout all of it. 10

B. The Law in Relation to Juvenile Proceedings.
There have been few reported cases which scrutinize legislative
and judicial attempts to restrict the publication of the identities of
minors subject to juvenile court proceedings. As the discussion
below reveals, although a few courts have held that the imposition of
restrictions on the media regarding publication of identifying information is justified, the holdings of recent Supreme Court decisions
regarding this and related issues are to the contrary.
A federal district court in Government of Virgin Islands v.
Brodhurst'0 ' upheld a statute making it a misdemeanor to publish
the names of children under juvenile court jurisdiction without court
permission. The court rejected press claims that the statute violated
first amendment rights; it found that this was a reasonable restriction on 06the press in the interest of rehabilitating youthful offenders.

1

In Ithaca JournalNews, Inc. v. City Court of Ithaca,0' 7 the court
which had ordered juveniles' records sealed held a newspaper
reporter in contempt for publishing the identities of the youths. The
reporter, however, had learned the identities of the youths while they
were a matter of public record and before the court entered its sealing order. The New York Supreme Court sidestepped the constitutional questions involved by reversing the lower court's decision on
the ground that its order directing the news media not to identify the
youths exceeded the powers conferred on it by the legislature. 108
In Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court of Oklahoma
County, "othe question arose again as a result of a court order for104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976).
285 F. Supp. 831 (D.V.I. 1968).
Id. at 838.
58 Misc. 2d 73, 294 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
Id. at ___,294 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
555 P.2d 1286 (Okla. 1976).
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bidding publication of the name and picture of an eleven year old
who was before the juvenile court on a murder charge. Information
about him had been obtained when the minor appeared at a detention hearing at which members of the press were present with the
knowledge of the prosecutor, the judge, and defense counsel. The
newspaper publisher had relied on Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn '" in publishing the juvenile's name."' The United States
Supreme Court in Cox had held that the state could not impose sanctions on the press for publishing the name of a rape victim "which
was publicly revealed in connection with the prosecution of a
crime.'"" 2 The Oklahoma Supreme Court distinguished Cox, finding that, unlike criminal proceedings, juvenile court hearings are not
public unless expressly so ordered by the judge.'II The Oklahoma
Supreme Court, applying the rationale of Nebraska Press Assn. v.
Stuart,I" held that the restraining order could not be upheld on the
grounds that it was necessary to assure a fair trial because there were
no findings that a fair trial was otherwise unobtainable and less
drastic alternatives to prior restraint had been considered.", However, the court upheld the order; relying on the rationale of Government of Virgin Islands v. Brodhurst,",6 the court held that the state's
interest in the rehabilitation of the minors justified the restriction on
publication of minors' identities.""
This decision was overturned by the United States Supreme Court
in Oklahoma PublishingCo. v. DistrictCourt In and For Oklahoma
County. ,,8
In a per curiam opinion the Court stated that the rationales of Nebraska Press and Cox compelled a holding that the
restraining order violated first amendment rights. "Whether or not
the trial judge expressly made such an order, members of the press
were in fact present at the hearing with the full knowledge
of the
9
presiding judge, the prosecutor and the defense counsel." "
The rationale underlying Government of Virgin Islands v. Brodhurst'2 appears to have been totally rejected by the Supreme Court
in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia.'2 ' The question
110. 420 U.S.469 (1975).
111. 555 P.2dat 1293.
112. 420 U.S. at 471.
113. 555 P.2dat 1293.
114, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
115. 555 P.2dat 1289-90.
116. 285 F. Supp. 831 (D.V.1. 1968).
117. 555 P.2d at 1293, 1295.
118. 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
119. Id. at311.
120. 285 F.Supp. 831 (D.V.I. 1968).
121. 435 U.S. 829(1978).
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presented in this case was whether the first amendment permits criminal punishment of newspaper publishers, strangers to the inquiry,
for divulging or publishing truthful information lawfully obtained
regarding confidential proceedings of the state Judicial Inquiry and
Review Commission. The Virginia Supreme Court agreed that the
"clear and present danger" test was the appropriate constitutional
benchmark. It found that the test had been met because premature
disclosure of the Commission's sensitive proceedings would result in
imminent impairment of the effectiveness of the Commission and
immediate threat to the orderly administration of justice.' 22 The
United States Supreme Court rejected that conclusion.
The threat to the administration of justice posed by the speech
and publications in Bridges, Pennekamp, Craig, and Wood was,
if anything, more direct and substantial than the threat posed by
Landmark's article. If the clear-and-present-danger test could
not be satisfied in the more extreme circumstances of those
cases, it would seem to follow that the test cannot be met here. It
is true that some risk of injury to the judge under inquiry, to the
system of justice, or to the operation of the Judicial Review and
Inquiry Commission may be posed by premature disclosure, but
the test requires that the danger be "clear and present" and in
our view the risk here falls far short of that requirement. Moreover, much of the risk can be eliminated through careful internal
procedures to protect the confidentiality of Commission proceedings.' 3
The Supreme Court assumed for purposes of decision that the confidentiality provision serves legitimate state interests. It observed,
however, that the real question was whether these interests are sufficient to justify the imposition of criminal sanctions against nonparticipants such as Landmark. In concluding that they were not,
the Court stated:
[N]either the Commonwealth's interest in protecting the reputation of its judges, nor its interest in maintaining the institutional
integrity of its courts is sufficient to justify the subsequent punishment of speech at issue here, even on the assumption that criminal sanctions do in fact enhance the guarantee of confidentiality. 114
The latest case dealing with the question of whether a state statute
making it a crime for newspapers to publish the identities of minors
122. Id. at 833.
123. Id. at 845 (footnote omitted).
124. Id. at 841.
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involved in delinquency proceedings violates first amendment guarantees of press freedom was decided by the Supreme Court in 1979.
In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. , 2 the newspapers uncovered
the identity of an accused youthful slayer through their own investigative techniques. They did not obtain the information as the
result of attending a public hearing as was the case in Oklahoma
Publishing. In Smith, as in Landmark, the information the newspapers obtained and published, although confidential, was truthful
and did not involve any wrongdoing on the part of the newspapers.
In Landmark, the Supreme Court found that neither Virginia's interest in protecting its judges' reputations nor its interest in maintaining its courts' institutional integrity justified the punishment of
speech. It is not surprising, therefore, that the United States
Supreme Court ruled in Smith that West Virginia's interest in protecting the reputation of juveniles to aid in rehabilitation did not
justify the punishment of speech. 2 ' A seven member majority, in an
opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, relied heavily on Davis v.
Alaska.'2I The Court noted that in Davis it had declared that the
state's interest in protecting a juvenile court record from public
exposure must yield to an accused's right under the sixth amendment
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him. 2' 8 In Smith,
the Court held that even though a state has a substantial interest in
the rehabilitation of youthful offenders, the first amendment prohibits the state from attempting to accomplish that goal by subjecting newspapers to subsequent punishment for publishing truthful
information about the identity of a youthful offender when such
information had been lawfully obtained through their own investigative methods. 2 9
Justice Rehnquist, in a separate concurring opinion, stated that a
state's interest in preserving the anonymity of its juvenile offenders
was of the highest order, far outweighing the minimal interference
with freedom of the press that a ban on publication of the youths'
names entails.' 3 ° He concurred, however, in the result. He found
that the statute did not accomplish its purpose and should be struck
down because the West Virginia statute only imposed a prohibition
against newspapers, while allowing the electronic media and other
forms of publication to announce the youth's name with impun125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

99 S. Ct. 2667 (1979).
Id. at 2671-72.
415 U.S. 308 (1974).
99 S. Ct. at 2671.
Id. at 2671-72.
Id. at 2673 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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ity.' 3 ' He then made it clear that he would find a general ban on
publication that applied to all forms of mass communication, electronic and print media alike, to be constitutional.' 3 2
The narrow state court holdings of Nebraska Press, Oklahoma
Publishing, Landmark, and Gannett leave important questions
unanswered: is it constitutionally permissible for a state to deny all
public and press access to juvenile court proceedings as a way of
preserving confidentiality? Is it permissible for a state to condition
press access to juvenile court proceedings upon written agreement by
the press not to publish-the identity of the minor unless the minor is
transferred to adult criminal court for trial and to punish breaches
of such agreements through criminal sanction or contempt of court?
As the Supreme Court of Massachusetts observed in Ottaway
Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, "I issues different from those in
Nebraska Press, Cox Broadcasting, and Oklahoma Publishing are
raised by the question of how far a state is constitutionally required
to go in assisting press access to court proceedings and files. 3 , As all
the foregoing questions were expressly reserved in those cases and
were not in issue in Smith nor in Gannett, they remain in uncharted
constitutional waters.
THE NATIONAL STANDARDS
In formulating recommendations to cover news media access to,
and disclosure of information from, juvenile police and court
records as well as from juvenile delinquency hearings, examination
of the Standards promulgated by the Task Force on Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention'35 (hereinafter referred to as the Task
Force) and the Institute For Judicial Administration-American Bar
Association Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards' 3 6
(hereinafter referred to as IJA-ABA) should be considered.
Access to and Disclosure of Police and Court Records
A. Task Force Standards.
Standard 5.14 sets forth the general rule that police records on
juveniles should be kept separate from adult records and, except by
131. Id. at 2674-75.
132. Id. at 2675.
133. 372 Mass. 539, 362 N.E.2d 1189 (1977).
134. Id. at -, 362N.E.2d at 1195.
135. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: Report of the
Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (1976) [hereinafter cited as Task
Force Report].
136. IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating to Juvenile Records
and Information Systems (Tent. Draft 1977) [hereinafter cited as IJA-ABA StandardsJuvenile Records].
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court order, should not be open to inspection nor their contents
disclosed; criminal justice agencies must justify their inspection of
the records on a need-to-know basis.13 7 The commentary accompanying the standard asserts that protection of the privacy of
juvenile records is a matter on which there must be community
agreement and calls for cooperation on the part of the juvenile
court, the police, other agencies in the juvenile justice system, and
the news media.' 38
Standard 5.13 recommends that each state enact legislation requiring confidential police handling of identifying information about
juveniles.' 3 9 The standard also provides that with exception of "dangerous fugitives" (which term is not defined), law enforcement agencies should not release names or photographs of juvenile law
violators to the news media.'4" The commentary to Standard 5.13
cautions, however, that inflexible regulations prohibiting publication of a juvenile suspect's identification under all circumstances are
not in the public interest.'" It is sometimes necessary to publish or
broadcast the names of "dangerous juvenile fugitives" who have
escaped in order to obtain information that may lead to apprehension and to protect citizens who might come in contact with the fugitives. 142
The Task Force Report also recommends that if the juvenile court
waives its jurisdiction and transfers a minor accused of a crime to
the adult criminal court for trial, the proscription on release of information should not apply."" Confidentiality is based upon the
protection and rehabilitation purposes of the juvenile system; in
cases in which the court determines that the juvenile is not amenable
to treatment within the system, confidentiality is inappropriate. '"
Standard 28.2 provides that juvenile court records should not be
made public and that access to and use of court records should be
strictly controlled. This standard seeks to minimize the risk that information will be misused or misinterpreted, that children will be
unnecessarily denied opportunities and benefits, or that the rehabilitative purposes of court intervention will be disturbed. "
Finally, Standard 28.5 recommends that states enact legislation
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Task Force Report, supra note 135, at 226.
Id.at 227.
Id. at 224.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ld.at 225.
Id.
Id. at 773.
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providing for sealing of juvenile records including police records
when, due to dismissal of a petition, the rehabilitation of the juvenile, or the passage of time, the adverse consequences that may result
from disclosure of such records outweigh the necessity or usefulness
of retaining them.'4 6 Once a juvenile record is sealed, only the
juvenile involved or an authorized representative should have access
to the record. 4"7
B. IJA-ABA Standards.
Standard 20.1" and Standard 19.4,'" like Task Force Standard
5.14,'5 recommend that records and files maintained by a law enforcement agency pertaining to the arrest, detention, adjudication,
or disposition of a juvenile's case should not be a public record and
should be kept in a secure place separate from adult records and
files.
Standard 19.6'1' permits fingerprinting and photographing juveniles taken into custody for the purpose of police investigation.
Unlike Task Force Standard 5.13,152 it does not allow release of
names and photographs of "dangerous juvenile fugitives" or juveniles transferred to adult court for trial.
Standard 15.1'" parallels Task Force Standard 28.2;'4 juvenile
court records should not be public records and access to them must
be strictly controlled. Under Standard 15.2111 reporters should not
be given access to court records; reporters might, however, qualify
as researchers under Standard 5.6156 provided they give assurances
that anonymity of the juvenile and his family will be protected. The
commentary in support of Standard 15.2' 7 acknowledges that the
question of news media publicity about juvenile court proceedings
has been the subject of some debate and that some states provide
that juvenile offenders' identities should be published. It notes that
most states have no statute governing the issue; some, however, prohibit publication of identities. Standard 15.2 allocates to juvenile
146. Id. at 781.
147. Id.
148. IJA-ABA Standards-Juvenile Records, supra note 136, at 147.
149. Id. at 142.
150. See Task Force Report, supra note 135, at 226 and text accompanying note 137 supra.
151. IJA-ABA Standards-Juvenile Records, supra note 136, at 143-44.
152. See Task Force Report, supra note 135, at 224 and text accompanying notes 139 and
140-42 supra.
153. IJA-ABA Standards-Juvenile Records, supranote 136, at 115.
154. See Task Force Report, supra note 135, at 773 and text accompanying note 145 supra.
155. IJA-ABA Standards-Juvenile Records, supranote 136, at 116.
156. Id. at 84.
157. Id. at 1t6-18.
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courts the responsibility of limiting access to their own records,
thereby avoiding the issue of the constitutionality of a statute purporting to exercise direct control over the contents of publication.' 5 8
Standards 17.1 through 17.7 59' and 22.1160 provide for destruction
of juvenile court and police records after a certain period of time has
elapsed and after attempts to notify the juvenile who is the subject of
a record. The juvenile may be provided with a copy of the record
upon request.
It is clear that both standard-promulgating groups opt in favor of
confidentiality, even though it limits the ability of the press to
monitor a public institution, on the theory that the costs of publicity
(a reduction in the chance for success of juvenile court intervention)
outweigh the benefits of publicity (deterrence).
News Media Access to Juvenile Court Hearings
A. The Adjudicatory Hearing.
In a delinquency adjudication hearing, the primary issue is
whether the minor committed the alleged act. Both the Task Force
Standards and the IJA-ABA Standards recommend that the delinquency adjudication hearing be public and open to the press at the
request of the minor and his counsel.' 6 ' In addition, the IJA-ABA
Standards recommend that a minor be afforded a jury trial upon demand at the delinquency adjudication hearing.' In support of its
recommendation for a public trial, the IJA-ABA commentary cites
many of the benefits alluded to in In re Oliver and RLR v. State,
discussed above,' 63 and in support of trial by jury declares that the
benevolent purposes of juvenile courts and the appellate process are
the overzealous pronot sufficient procedural protection against
64
secutor and the biased or eccentric judge.'
The Task Force Standards are silent on whether a minor may opt
for a private hearing and exclude the news media. IJA-ABA Standard 6.2, however, declares that each jurisdiction should provide by
law that the judge of the juvenile court has discretion to permit
members of the public who have a legitimate interest in the proceedings or in the work of the court, including representatives of the
158. Id. at 116.
159. Id. at 126-32.
160. Id. at 152.
161. Task Force Report, supra note 135, Std 13.4 & note, at 420-21; IJA-ABA StandardsAdjudication, Std 6.1 & note, at 70-72 (Tent. Draft 1977).
162. [JA-ABA Standards-Adjudication, supra note 161, Std 4.1 & note, at 52-56.
163. See text accompanying notes 21 & 32 supra.
164. IJA-ABA Standards-Adjudication, supra note 161, Std 6.1 & note, at 52-56.
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news media, to view adjudication proceedings even in cases in which
the defendant has waived the right to a public trial. ' The commentary, while acknowledging these are sharply conflicting views, enunciates several reasons why representatives of the media should be
allowed to view private proceedings. First, the public has a right to
know about the workings of the judicial system, including that part
which deals with juveniles.' 6 6 Second, the public's representatives
exert a balancing influence on the court's operation and thus protect
the accused. '67 Another reason, not mentioned in the commentary, is
that public attention needs to be drawn to the juvenile court's lack of
rehabilitative resources.' 68 Where the minor has opted for a private
trial and the judge has admitted the public, IJA-ABA Standard 6.3
provides that each jurisdiction'should provide by law that persons so
admitted not be allowed to disclose the identity of the minor and that
the judge so announce to persons attending the adjudication hearing.' 69 The commentary proposes an alternative method to achieve
the same result by stating that, although a state may not provide that
records or proceedings are public and then prohibit publication of
accurate information obtained from them, states do have flexibility
in determining which records and proceedings are to be categorized
as public.' 7 0
B. The Dispositional Hearing.
The delinquency dispositional hearing occurs after the adjudication hearing if the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the
minor committed the offenses with which he was charged.' 71 The
focus of the inquiry at the dispositional hearing is how much official
intervention in the minor's life is necessary to protect the public and
assist the minor in conforming his conduct to the requirements of the
law.' 72 Sanctions for delinquent behavior can include an official
reprimand, probation, or institutionalization in a juvenile prison
(euphemistically called a training school). 7 3 Information utilized by
the court in making the dispositional decision often includes a written report prepared by a probation officer covering such aspects of
165.
166.
167.
168.
supra.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id., Std 6.2, at 72-73.
Id.note, at 74.
Id.
See In re L., 24 Or. App. 257, 546 P.2d 153 (1976) and text accompanying notes 83-87
JA-ABA Standards-Adjudication, supra note 161, Std 6.3, at 75.
Id. note, at 75-76 (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)).
See 111.Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 705-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
See Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 705-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
Id.
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the minor's life as family background, school record, and prior contacts with social welfare agencies, law enforcement agencies, and the
juvenile court.' 7 In cases in which the minor's mental health is in
question, the court might also receive a psychologist's or psychia-

trist's report. 175

Therefore, at the dispositional hearing, unlike the adjudicatory
hearing, intimate details of the minor's personal and family life may
be revealed. Should the news media be permitted to attend all or part
of this hearing? The IJA-ABA Standards specifically recognize that
the public has a legitimate interest in the adjudicatory proceeding at
which the minor's guilt or lack thereof is determined."'7 The IJAABA Standards do not acknowledge, however, that the public,
through the news media, has a proper interest in the hearing at which
the court determines what action is to be taken to protect the public
and rehabilitate the minor.
IJA-ABA Standard 3.1 governing Dispositional Procedures, entitled "Necessary and Allowable Parties" provides: "The juvenile,
the attorney for the juvenile, the juvenile's parents or guardian, and
an attorney for the state should be present at all stages of the dispositional proceeding. Other parties with a bona fide interest in the pro, The comceedings may be present at the discretion of the court." 77
mentary following this standard notes that numerous statutes bar
the general public from juvenile proceedings, including the dispositional phase, and that the IJA-ABA supports such a bar with respect
to dispositional proceedings.'7 8 Examples of persons whom the
judge might permit at his discretion to attend the dispositional hearing as a party with a "bona fide interest" include "legitimate researchers, students, individuals connected with other juvenile justice
systems, law clinic interns, etc."' 79 Conspicuously absent from this
list are news media representatives. The Task Force standards are
silent as to whether the news media are entitled to any information
concerning dispositional proceedings.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the great majority of states, juvenile court statutes express the
policy that minors involved in juvenile court proceedings ought to be
174. See 111.Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 705-1(3) (Smith-Hurd 1972).
175. See 111.Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 706-3 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
176. See text accompanying notes 166-67 & 169 supra.
177. 1JA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating to Dispositional Procedures 41 (Tent. Draft 1977).
178. Id. note, at 41-42.
179. Id. at 42.
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afforded the protection of confidentiality. Most states have attempted to achieve this goal by limiting public and press access to
juvenile police and court records and to juvenile court proceedings.
This policy of confidentiality is often thwarted by information
"leaks" which have prompted a few states to pass laws prohibiting
publication of the identities of juveniles involved in such proceedings
under sanction of criminal punishment. In Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co., the Supreme Court declared that such proscriptions
unconstitutionally abridge the first amendment guarantee of press
freedom. The holdings of Nebraska Press, Cox Broadcasting,Oklahoma Publishing,Landmark and now Smith compel the conclusion
that, once truthful information has found its way into the public domain, attempts to restrict the news media from publishing it are constitutionally intolerable absent any showing of improper conduct on
the part of the news media in obtaining the information and absent a
clear and present danger to national security or the right of the accused to receive a fair trial. Although states can do little, consistent
with the first amendment guarantee of press freedom, to restrict
publication of information that has entered the public domain,
states still have much latitude in determining what information is
available to the public and the press. State laws declaring that the
interest in preserving confidentiality in the juvenile court process
outweighs the public's right of unlimited access to information
about the system and its clientele are on fairly firm constitutional
ground. Although the Supreme Court has indicated that the first
amendment prohibition against abridgement of press freedom undoubtedly carries with it a right of the press to gather information, I"
it has never defined whether or to what extent a state is obligated to
assist or refrain from hampering the news media in gathering information.1 8 , State laws and court rules prohibiting public and press access to juvenile court proceedings and records are therefore probably
safe from constitutional attack as violative of the first amendment.
The tradition of confidentiality that has permeated the juvenile court
system since its inception in Illinois in 1899 supports this conclusion.
It can, however, be forcefully argued that to preserve confidentiality at the cost of prohibiting press access to juvenile court proceedings would be a cure far worse than the disease of misuse and
180. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
181. But see Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979), wherein newspaper argues
that exclusion of news media at the request of prosecution and defense from pretrial suppression hearing violates the first amendment absent a showing of clear and present danger to the
right of the accused to obtain a fair trial. Gannett would seem to indicate that state laws restricting press access to court proceedings are on firm constitutional grounds.
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misinterpretation of information by the news media. Courts are
institutions, the actions of which significantly affect the public, and
in which the public, therefore, has a vital interest. Juvenile courts
are no exception. As the societal institutions charged with the
responsibility of alleviating and ameliorating the problems of, or
caused by, troubled and troublesome youth, they are properly the
object of special public concern. Juvenile courts need to be held accountable to the children and families whom they serve and to the
general public as well. In addition, juvenile courts, like other public
institutions, are more apt to function fairly, efficiently, and effectively if their performance is monitored by agencies outside the
scope of their own administrative framework. The press has historically served that function with respect to government and its
agencies and should continue to do so with respect to juvenile courts.
How then are the tensions between the public policy of preserving
the protective nature of juvenile proceedings by affording a measure
of confidentiality to its clients and the needs of the press to gather
and disseminate information to the public about these important
courts to be rationally and consistently resolved? As the foregoing
analysis indicates, state laws and court rules have often not achieved
a satisfactory balance. Editorial policies formulated by the newspapers and the broadcast media in response to the problem have
been ambivalent and inconsistent. 8 The Supreme Court's decision
182. On July 2, 1978 the Chicago Sun-Times published an article entitled, "Chicago Press
Brought to Carpet Over a Name." Chicago Sun-Times, July 2, 1978, at 40. It related to a story
about how a single paragraph in an otherwise routine story concerning the arrest of 18 year old
Clifford Finley resulted in a confrontation between the right of the press to disclose information and the right of a defendant accused of crime toa fair trial and to have his police and court
record kept confidential as required by Illinois law. Id. at 40, col. I Finley was charged with a
number of serious felonies of violence as a result of a shooting in Chicago of a tourist from
Ohio. Id. Under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, law enforcement records of all minors under
the age of seventeen are not open to public inspection, nor may their contents be disclosed except by order of court. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 702-8 (Smith-Hurd 1972). Despite the existence
of the statute, a story in the Chicago Tribune carried a detailed description of the defendant's
juvenile police record, including the fact that he had been arrested "16 times as a juvenile since
he was 9 years old. Juvenile charges included burglary, strong-armed robbery, shoplifting,
theft, disorderly conduct, purse snatching, criminal damage to property and criminal trespass
to a vehicle." Chicago Sun-Times, July 2, 1978 at 40, col. 1. The richness of detail with which
the defendant's record was described led his attorneys to charge that his juvenile files had been
"leaked." Id. One of the defendant's attorneys, calling the Tribune article a "plain violation
of the Juvenile Court Act," filed a motion in juvenile court asking that both reporters appear
in court and reveal their source of the secret information. Id. He contended that only by
discovering who had unlawfully disclosed the information could the Juvenile Court Act be
made real and viable to protect future defendants from this abuse. Id.
Clayton Kirkpatrick, a Tribune editor, when questioned about editorial policy concerning
publication of juvenile names and records, was quoted as saying that, although, generally
speaking, names were not used, "if the case is particularly flagrant, and the juvenile is towards
the upper end of the age bracket, then we consider using his name." Chicago Sun-Times, July
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in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. is evidence that the Court
views the problem as one of national importance. However, that
decision only determines the narrow question of whether it is a violation of the first amendment protection of press freedom for a state
to punish criminally newspapers for publishing the identity of a
juvenile, subject to juvenile court proceedings, when the identity was
truthful and lawfully obtained. The far more important policy questions concerning what information about juvenile court proceedings
ought to be available to the press and what information ought to be
published remain unanswered.
An examination of the Task Force Standards and the IJA-ABA
Standards reveals that they too have left many questions concerning
access to information and plans for controlling dissemination of information unanswered. Perhaps the time has come to form a task
force consisting of academic and practicing attorneys, judges with
expertise and experience in juvenile courts, and members of the news
media. This task force should pinpoint problems and formulate a set
2, 1978 at 40, col. 2. The questions that remain, however, are who should determine when the
case is "flagrant," and when a juvenile has reached the age bracket where publication of his
name is appropriate? Editor Kirkpatrick further defended the use for this purpose of juvenile
files stating, "we are justified in getting information from the files; we are not doing it for
frivolous reasons. A strict proscription against using those records . . . might lead to situations where a reporter's suspicions about juvenile court proceedings could not be investigated
because an inflexible policy would preclude a review of those courts." Id. These statements indeed reveal the crux of the dilemma.
The Sun-Times article pointed out that the defendant's attorneys move to force disclosure of
the reporters' sources collided head-on with another statute giving journalists a modified
privilege against revealing the names of secret informants. Under the Illinois reporter's
privilege law, no court can compel disclosure unless it can be demonstrated that "a specific
public interest . . . would be adversely affected if the factual information sought were not
disclosed." 111.Ann. Stat. ch. 51, § 114 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1979). To compel disclosure the
court must further find that "all other available sources of information have been exhausted"
and that identifying the source "is essential to the protection of the public interest involved."
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 51, § 117 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979). The Sun-Times reporter also noted that
according to the official Sun-Times style book the disclosure of a juvenile's name "should be
considered an integral part of the story" when the juvenile is involved in a "felonious crime"
that is given "prominent display." Chicago Sun-Times, July 2, 1978 at 40, col. 2. However,
despite the official policy stated in the style book, he noted that, according to Ralph Otwell, a
Sun-Times editor, a juvenile's name or previous arrest record is rarely disclosed in the paper.
Id. Editor Otwell further stated that the juvenile would only be identified by name if a decision
were made by the juvenile court to permit trial of the youth in an adult criminal court. Id. The
Sun-Times reporter's survey of Chicago's three network television stations revealed that
general policy is not to report the name of a youthful defendant, but all networks said exceptions to the policy do exist. Id.
The foregoing illustrates that, as confusing and conflicting as the law appears to be in attempting to achieve a proper balance between a juvenile's need for confidentiality in juvenile
court and the news media's right to gather and disseminate information about the court and
serious juvenile offenders, journalists in formulating editorial policy seem to do little better in
establishing ones that are both more rational and more consistent.
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of standards to govern press access to information about juvenile
court proceedings and dispositions, and to govern the dissemination
and publication of statistical data and individually identifying information on juveniles accused of delinquency or adjudicated delinquent. As the foregoing material suggests, the problems are difficult, but resolution of some may be possible through dialogue between journalists, lawyers, and judges who have experience and
interest in the operation of the juvenile justice system. Satisfactory
resolutions of these problems, however, can only be achieved
through joint effort and cooperation between professional journalists and the legal profession.
The formulation of a set of national standards governing access to
and dissemination of information concerning juveniles charged with
delinquent conduct would be the major goal of such a task force.
Once a set of standards had been formulated, the question of implementation would remain. Since laws attempting to restrict publication of information by the press are unlikely to withstand first
amendment scrutiny, the task force might recommend the following
implementary mechanism: each state formulates juvenile court procedural rules which incorporate the national task force standards'
recommendations on access to information by the news media. Access would be conditioned upon the news media signing written
agreements to abide by the standards' recommendations governing
the publication or other dissemination of such information. In this
way a reasonable and consistent balance might be achieved between
the goal of protecting juveniles from the full public impact of
youthful mistakes and the goal of disseminating information to the
public about the operation of juvenile courts. Such dissemination is
required to assess fairly not only the efficiency and effectiveness of
juvenile courts but also the need for their continued existence.

